Journal of Technology Law & Policy
Volume 11

Issue 1

Article 4

June 2006

The Inconsistent Treatment of Computer Software as Patentable
Subject Matter
Steven M. Greenberg

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jtlp

Recommended Citation
Greenberg, Steven M. (2006) "The Inconsistent Treatment of Computer Software as Patentable Subject
Matter," Journal of Technology Law & Policy: Vol. 11: Iss. 1, Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jtlp/vol11/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Technology Law & Policy by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

THE INCONSISTENT TREATMENT OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE
AS PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER

Steven M Greenberg*

I.

INTRODUCTION ......................................

77

IH.

GENERAL PATENT LAW OVERVIEW ......................

79

III.

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF SOFTWARE PATENTS ..............

81

A. InitialJurisprudence ..............................
B. Changing Views of Software as Technology ............
C. Modern Jurisprudenceand the Practical
Application of an Abstract Idea ......................

81
83

IV.

DIVERGENCE OF THE MODERN

USPTO .......................
A. PublishedUSPTO Guidelinesfor Examining
Computer-RelatedInventions .......................
B. EmpiricalConstriction of Software Patents ............

86

RECONVERGENCE ....................................

89
89

JURISPRUDENCE AND THE

V.

VI.

84

86
87

A. In re Lundgren ...................................
B. Proposed2005 Guidelinesfor the
Patentabilityof Software .........................

90

CONCLUSION ........................................

91

I. INTRODUCTION

Computer software relates to the tangible embodiment of operational
logic defined for a computing platform. Originally viewed in the form of
a sequence of instructions, computer software has evolved from program
code reduced to punch card form, to program code in electronic source
code form, able to be compiled or interpreted within a host computing
platform. Modem variants of computer software stretch the commonly
understood meaning of the term to include markup language specified
* Steven Greenberg is a founding partner of the Intellectual Property boutique law firm of
Carey, Rodriguez, Greenberg & Paul, LLP and an Adjunct Faculty Member of the University of
Florida, Levin College of Law.
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logic often embodied in "server pages." The advent of the Java
programming environment (and Java-like comparables such as C#) has
further blurred the definition of computer software.
Though often confused in the context of intellectual property law,
computer software refers both to a computer program in its inert, source
code form, and also to a computer program in its operational object code
form. Source code is the human-readable assembly of instructions
conforming to a particular programming language or specification. Popular
examples include the procedurally oriented PASCAL programming
language and the object oriented C++ programming language. In most
cases, however, source code must be processed by another computer
program in order to be transformed into program instructions that can be
understood by the processing unit of a computing device. The result of this
transformation is referred to as the object code, which is seldom described
as "human-readable."
At its core, computer software reflects an algorithm or a nested
arrangement of algorithms. Defined broadly as most commonly
understood in the field of computer science, an algorithm is "a wellordered collection of unambiguous and effectively computable operations
that, when executed, produces a result and halts in a finite amount of
time."' To wit, computer programs implemented according to a procedural
programming language universally can be described by way of a flow
chart, demonstrating an algorithm or a nested set of algorithms. Even
object-oriented computer programs at some level incorporate sequential
logic able to be modeled according to a flow chart.
The algorithmic nature of computer software can inherently conflict
with the letter of U.S. patent law. In this regard, black letter patent law
explicitly excludes "abstract ideas" from consideration as patentable
subject matter.2 In layman's terms, technologies that reflect mere
implementations of a computable algorithm are not to be considered
patentable under United States law.3 From the standpoint of the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO),4 at least a "practical application"
of the algorithm or a "useful, concrete and tangible result" must follow
from the implementation of the computable algorithm in order to achieve
patentability.

1. M. SCHNEIDER & J. GERSTING, AN INVITATION TO COMPUTER SCIENCE 9 (2000).

2. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2005).
3. Patent and Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examination Procedure § 2106(IV)(B)(1)
(Oct. 2005) [hereinafter MPEP].
4. Id. § 2106(II)(A) (citing State Street Bank& Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d
1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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Over the past two decades, the U.S. Supreme Court as well as the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has not provided specific
direction in relation to the patentability of computer software. The
Supreme Court has only stated that "anything under the sun that is made
by man" is patentable subject matter' and that process claims performed
by a computer program, and particularly, process claims recited as part of
a "business method," are to be examined for patentability in no different
fashion than any other process claim.6 Notwithstanding, the Examining
Corps of the USPTO continues to struggle with this interpretation, and
oftentimes wholly ignores the clear directive of the Supreme Court and the
Federal Circuit, resulting in the inconsistent treatment of computer
software within the USPTO and within the judicial branch of our United
States government.
II. GENERAL

PATENT LAW OVERVIEW

The grant of letters patent has been part and parcel of American
jurisprudence since our nation's birth. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
U.S. Constitution states, "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited [t]imes to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." The United States Patent Act derives its authority from the
Constitution and has been codified at title 35 of the U.S. Code. As
provided by the Patent Act, a twenty-year term of exclusivity to an
invention will be awarded to an inventor who seeks the award for
inventing a "new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."7
Generally, one seeking patent protection for an invention prepares and
files a patent application with the USPTO and expects that an Examiner
assigned to examine the patent application will determine whether the
patent application describes and claims an invention satisfying the
statutory requirements of patentability. The statutory requirements of
patentability include a determination of whether the claimed invention is
new or has attained novelty in view of prior art publications, existing
technologies, and public knowledge. The statutory requirements of
patentability further include a determination of whether the claimed

5.
6.
7.
8.

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2005).
See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2002).
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invention is not a mere obvious variation of what already is known in the
art.9 Finally, the statutory requirements of patentability also include a
determination of whether the claimed invention has a utility that is not
excluded as a mere law of nature or abstract idea.' °
To achieve a proper examination, the Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (MPEP), a text produced by the USPTO for the benefit of the
Examining Corps as a guideline for examining patent applications,
requires a particular format of the patent application. The format is
intended to facilitate an Examiner's review of the patent application in
order to ascertain the state of the art, the nature of the claimed invention,
and the scope of the claimed invention. Generally, a patent application
begins with a "background section" describing the state of the art, and
continues with a "detailed description" of an embodiment of the invention,
including companion figures and illustrations. Finally, the patent
application culminates with a set of "claims" which provide a textual
description of the boundaries of the claimed invention."
It is the claims themselves that determine the scope of protection
sought for an invention, and not the content of the remaining portions of
a patent application. For example, hypothetical apparatus and process
claims can include:
An apparatus comprising:
(A) a first widget;
(B) a second widget; and,
(C) a third widget.

A method comprising the steps of:
(A) doing a first step;
(B) doing a second step; and,
(C) doing a third step.

In both cases, a USPTO Examiner will search a limited, albeit
voluminous, selection of publications (including issued and published
domestic and international patent applications) in order to locate elements
A, B, and C, either wholly within one publication, or across multiple
publications. If successful, in the former circumstance, the Examiner will
reject the claim as lacking novelty, whereas in the latter circumstance, the
Examiner will reject the claim as a mere obvious variation of the known
art.
Other patentability criteria exist aside from novelty and nonobviousness, although the battle fought and occasionally won in the
9. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2004).
10. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2005).
11. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2002); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2005).
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USPTO usually relates to one of novelty and non-obviousness. The
additional criteria include that of written description, enablement, and
utility.12 To determine the satisfaction of the written description and
enablement requirements, the Examiner usually refers to the detailed
description portion of the patent application to ensure that "one of ordinary
skill in the art" could make and use the claimed invention based upon a
study of the detailed description without engaging in undue
experimentation.
The latter determination, however, has proven squirrelly at best,when
applied to patent claims directed to computer-implemented inventions and
has varied over time according to the changing jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit. To compound matters, few
Examiners in the Examining Corps of the USPTO are attorneys.
Consequently, most lack the most basic legal training necessary to digest
the complex logic of the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court in decisions
pertaining to the patentability of computer software, in the way that most
experienced attorneys also lack the requisite training to digest those same
decisions.
I1. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF SOFTWARE PATENTS

A. InitialJurisprudence
The U.S. Supreme Court first expounded upon the patentability of
computer software in Gottschalk v. Benson, a mainframe-era decision by
Justice Douglas. 3 In Gottschalk, the Acting Commissioner of Patents
petitioned on behalf of the USPTO on writ of certiorari to determine
whether an invention directed to the conversion of a binary coded decimal
(BCD) into a pure binary number could satisfy the utility requirement of
35 U.S.C. § 101.14 Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, equated the
conversion from BCD to Binary to that of a mathematical algorithm.
Accordingly, Justice Douglas found the invention to fail as patentable
subject matter, as a contrary finding "would wholly preempt the
mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the
algorithm itself."' 5

12.
13.
14.
15.

35 U.S.C. § 112,
1 & 2 (2005).
Gottschalk v. Benson, 93 S.Ct. 253 (1972).
Id.at 254.
Id. at 257.
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Six years following Gottschalk, the U.S. Supreme Court again
addressed the patentability of computer software in Parkerv. Flook. 6 In
Parker,the Acting Commissioner for Patents, Lutrelle F. Parker, filed a
petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court seeking a determination
of whether a computer program computing an alarm when detecting an
upper limit in a catalytic conversion process qualifies as statutory subject
matter under the Patent Act.' 7 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, and
following the precedent of Gottschalk, concluded that it does not.
Specifically, Justice Stevens wrote, "[A] claim for an improved method of
calculation, even when tied to a specific end use, is unpatentable subject
matter under § 101."18
Three Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) decisions reflect
the restrictive jurisprudence built upon the Gottschalk and Parker
holdings. In 1972, the CCPA held in In re Freeman that a typesetting
system adapted for retrieving mathematical characters or symbols from a
font library memory, and spatially orienting the characters and symbols
with respect to one another in order to display and print the characters and
symbols, failed to qualify as statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §
101.'" Of note, the court in Freeman proposed a two-step test for
determining whether a claim preempts nonstatutory subject matter as a
whole in light of Gottschalk.2 ' The first prong of the test required a
determination of "whether the claim directly or indirectly recit[ed] an
'algorithm."21 If so, the second prong of the test required a determination
of whether the claim in its entirety preempted the algorithm.22 Importantly,
the Freeman court particularly distinguished a garden variety "algorithm"
from a "mathematical algorithm" recognizing that "every process may be
23
characterized as 'a step-by-step procedure for accomplishing some end."
The CCPA subsequently modified the Freeman test in In re Walter 24
and In re Abele.25 In 1980, the CCPA in Walter determined that the second
prong of the Freeman test should consider whether the mathematical
algorithm had been implemented in a certain manner so as either to define
structural relationships between the physical elements of the claim, or to
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

98 S. Ct. 2522 (1978).
Id. at 2524.
Id. at 2525.
In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1238 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
Id. at 1245-46.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1246.
618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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refine or limit claim steps in a process.26 If such a mathematical algorithm
were implemented, under Walter, the claim passed muster in accordance
with 35 U.S.C. § 101.27 Abele further expanded the scope of computerrelated inventions deemed patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 by requiring
of the second prong of the Freeman test that "the algorithm be 'applied in
any manner to physical elements or process steps,' provided that its
than a field of use limitation or nonapplication is circumscribed by more
28
activity.,
post-solution
essential
B. Changing Views of Software as Technology
The two-prong test introduced by Freemanand modified by Walter and
Abele became known as the Freeman-Walter-Abele test for the
patentability of computer software. Given the concrete requirement of a
"technical effect" of an algorithm in order to qualify for patentability, the
standard for patentability appeared to be mechanically applicable within
the USPTO and became the de facto standard for examining softwarerelated inventions for patentability by the Examining Corps. In so much
as the "technical effect" aspect of the two-prong test can be viewed as
more expansive than the near blanket prohibition on the patentability of
computer software, modem scholars consider Parkerthe high-water mark
for the unpatentability of computer software.
In 1980, the trend of Gottschalk within the U.S. Supreme Court
abruptly reversed course with the holding in Diamondv. Diehr.29 In Diehr,
the invention at issue related to a computer program enabled to compute
the "Arrhenius equation" for curing synthetic rubber.3 ° Utilizing data
collected from a series of sensors, the computer program determined when
the rubber had cured such that a mold press could be opened by an
operator. 3' Thus, a technical step could be found in "determining when to
open the mold press." Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
concluded that the claimed invention indeed qualified as patentable subject
matter, while heavily relying upon the holding in Chakrabarty,in which
the Court proclaimed "anything under the sun that is made by man" is
statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.32

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Walter, 618 F.2d at 767.
Id.
Abele, 684 F.2d at 907.
450 U.S. 175 (1981).
Id. at 177 n.2.
Id. at 178-79.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); see Diehr,450 U.S. at 191-93.
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The Freeman-Walter-Abele test remained the gold standard within the
USPTO for analyzing computer-related claims for patentability until the
1994 decision of In re Alappat.33 In an en banc decision of the Federal
Circuit, the court retreated from the prior jurisprudence of the CCPA and
pledged allegiance to the primary authority of Gottschalk, Parker, and
Diehr.34 In this regard, Judge Rich, writing for the majority, observed that
Diehrrecited only three categories of subject matter for which one may
not obtain patent protection: laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas. 35 As such, Judge Rich wrote that the court should not
expand the prohibition to include a fourth category for mathematical
algorithms.36
Importantly, Alappatdid not expressly limit the Freeman-Walter-Abele
test, as the Alappat court drew its inspiration from Diehrand Chakrabarty
and not prior decisions of the CCPA. Nevertheless, Alappat demoted the
importance of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test because the court affirmed
the requirement that the Examining Corps of the USPTO pay attention not
only to the claims of a patent application in determining a concrete,
tangible result under 35 U.S.C. § 101, but also that the Examining Corps
particularly consider the specification of the patent application to
determine exactly what had been invented as disclosed in the patent
application.37
C. Modern Jurisprudenceand the PracticalApplication of an
Abstract Idea
In 1998, the Federal Circuit dramatically departed from the well-worn
Freeman-Walter-Abele test in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
FinancialGroup, Inc.3" There, Judge Rich abandoned the reliance upon
presence or absence of physicality, the concrete, tangible result of Diehr,
and instead found patentability for a computer-implemented invention for
administering mutual funds in a hub-and-spoke arrangement.39 In
particular, Judge Rich found patentability simply by finding a practical
utility for an abstract idea.4" Even though the embodiment of the invention
at issue in State Street was nothing more than a computer program

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1542-43.
Id.
Id. at 1543 n.20.
See id. at 1540.
149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Id at 1373.
Id.
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executing within a personal computer, Judge Rich found practical
application of a mathematical algorithm in the transformation of data
representing discrete dollar amounts through a series of mathematical
calculations into a final share price.4
Importantly, State Street, unlike Alappat, directly addressed the
importance of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test. Specifically, Judge Rich
wrote, "After Diehrand Chakrabarty,the Freeman-Walter-Abele test has
little, if any, applicability to determining the presence of statutory subject
matter. ' 4 2 Judge Rich continued,
As we pointed out in Alappat ... application of the test could be
misleading, because a process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter employing a law of nature, natural
phenomenon, or abstract idea is patentable subject matter even
though a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea would
not, by itself, be entitled to such protection.43
Notably, the sole claim at issue in State Street related to a structural
machine configured to perform the business method of administering a
mutual fund. As such, some question remained after State Street as to
whether the analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 101 should apply equally to
process claims recited in the form of "a method comprising the steps of
.... "The Federal Circuit quickly set aside any doubts in AT&T Corp. v.
Excel Communications,Inc.' when it expanded the holding in State Street
to include any form of statutory preamble. Specifically, Judge Plager,
writing for the majority wrote, "Whether stated implicitly or explicitly, we
consider the scope of § 101 to be the same regardless of the form machine or process - in which a particular claim is drafted." '5 Thus,
AT&T and State Street exemplify the current jurisprudence for the Federal
Circuit: a patent claim directed to a software related invention, whether
stated in the form of a machine, article of manufacture, or process, is
patentable subject matter so long as the invention achieves a practical
application of an abstract idea, or produces a useful, tangible, and concrete
result. 6

41. Id.
42. Id. at 1374.
43. Id.
44. 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
45. Id. at 1357.
46. But cf Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2004), cert. granted, 73 U.S.L.W. 3298 (U.S. Oct. 31, 2005) (No. 04-607) (granting certiorari
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IV. DIVERGENCE OF THE MODERN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE USPTO

A. Published USPTO Guidelinesfor Examining ComputerRelatedInventions
In 1996, in response to the flurry of Federal Circuit holdings arising
from Alappat that addressed the patentability of computer software, the
USPTO issued Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions
(Examination Guidelines).47 Additionally, training materials for the
Examination Guidelines included a flow chart and a matrix to be used by
Examiners within the Examining Corps in determining whether a claimed
invention directed to computer software could be viewed as statutory
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.48 Two important questions were
included in the flow chart and matrix of the Examination Guidelines. 49 The
first question asked the Examiner whether the invention has a "practical
application. 50 More importantly, the second question asked the Examiner
whether the invention belongs in the "technological arts."'" Interestingly,
Alappat provided no instruction as to the latter question, and the
Examination Guidelines appear to have incorporated this critical question
without clear legal support.
Subsequent to the holding in State Street, the USPTO published a
modified section of the MPEP -

section 2106 -

relating to the

examination of computer-related inventions for patentability.52 Within
section 2106, the USPTO stated, "Only when the claim is devoid of any
limitation to a practical application in the technologicalarts should it be
rejected under 35 U.S.C. [§] 101.'53 Unlike the Examination Guidelines,
however, in section 2106 of the MPEP, the USPTO provided no direct
legal support to account for the "technological arts" requirement.
However, it would be nearly five years before the USPTO would correct

solely on the question of whether a method patent setting forth an indefinite, un-described and nonenabling step directing a party simply to correlate test results can claim a monopoly over a basic
scientific relationship used in medical treatment such that any doctor necessarily infringes the
patent merely by thinking about the relationship after looking at a test result).
47. 61 Fed. Reg. 7478 (Feb. 28, 1996).
48. See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/compexam/examcomp.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2006).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. MPEP, supra note 3, § 2106.
53. Id. § 2106(II)(A)(emphasis added).
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its error. In the interim, countless patent claims were rejected in the
USPTO for lack of patentability due to the phantom "technological arts"
test.
B. Empirical Constrictionof Software Patents
Empirically, in 2005, practitioners prosecuting claims in applications
assigned to USPTO Technology Center 2100 (TC2100) experienced a
substantial increase in claim rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 101, reporting
section 101 rejection increases of more than two-hundred percent over
2004 levels.54 Speculation as to the cause of the rapid and unexpected
increase in section 101 rejections for software patent claims generally
points to two main factors. First, inexperience levels among Examiners in
the pertinent group art units has been measured to be at an all-time high of
nearly forty percent." That is to say, more than forty percent of all
Examiners in TC2 100 have less than one year's experience. For many, the
position within the USPTO is a first job held after graduating college.
Moreover, attrition rates among experienced Examiners in TC2 100 now
approaches twenty-five percent.56 Given the complexity of determining
statutory subject matter, it is not reasonable to expect a junior examiner
without any legal training to properly find a rejection under 35 U.S.C. §
101 in most cases.
Speculation as to the cause of the rapid increase in section 101
rejections also points to a secretive group of highly experienced Examiners
who have alone interpreted the modem jurisprudence of statutory subject
matter and who maintain responsibility for supervising the issuance of
non-utility rejections for computer-related inventions under 35 U.S.C. §
101. 57 Referred to as Special Program Examiners (SPREEs), Junior
Examiners and even Primary Examiners in TC2100 and Technology
Center 2700 (TC2700) exclusively turn to the SPREEs for guidance when
determining the presence of non-statutory subject matter for a computerrelated invention.58 Other Examiners in the Examining Corps concede to

54. Search ofTC2100 patent applications in prosecution having at least one rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection for FY 2004 and FY 2005. The USPTO divides patent subject matter into
separate technology centers for different fields of science and technology. See
http://www.uspto.gov/web/info/pat-tech.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2006).
55. Mark T. Skoog (moderator), The Year in Review, American Intellectual Property Law
Association Annual Meeting (Oct. 29, 2005).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Private conversation with Patent Examiner Robert Stevens in Technology Center 2100
(Oct. 12, 2005).
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the existence of "Quality Assurance Specialists" (QUAS) who review
Office Actions issued by Examiners and impose perceived rejections under
35 U.S.C. § 101, even where the Principal Examiner has chosen not to
issue a rejection under section 101.
Predominantly, the section 101 rejections issued by the USPTO for
computer-related inventions in 2005 related to one of two separate
misconceptions among the Examining Corps with respect to the modem
jurisprudence of statutory subject matter. The first misconception involves
the "technological arts" requirement of the MPEP section 2106. Under the
technological arts requirement, an Examiner will fail to find statutory
subject matter if the claim, as a whole, does not relate to the technical arts.
Examiners often cite Alappat in support, however, the portion of Alappat
recited merely refers to the text of Diehr that makes no mention of a
"technological arts" requirement.59
The second misconception involves the "paper and pencil test" or
"mental steps test." Under the paper and pencil test, Examiners determine
whether the steps of a method claim can be practiced in the absence of a
computer and with the assistance of only the human mind or a pencil and
paper. If so, the claim is to be rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Often, if not
always, no support is recited in support of the assertion that the pencil and
paper test forms part of the modem jurisprudence.6" In fact, a careful
reading of the entirety of the MPEP section 2106 will fail to reveal the
mention of a paper and pencil test. In both cases, however, Junior
Examiners are quick to point to internal guidelines provided by the
SPREEs and QUAS which require these rejections.
The identity of the SPREEs and QUAS remains a closely held secret
within the ranks of the Examining Corps. On multiple occasions, Junior
Examiners have refused to reveal the identities of the QUAS or the
SPREEs, though all concede the existence of both groups of Examiners.6"
Notwithstanding, given the dearth of trained attorneys among the ranks of
the Examining Corps, it is more than likely that none have the requisite
legal background sufficient to understand the holding in State Street or
AT&T, let alone Alappat. Consequently, it should come as no surprise that
the expansive view of patentability of computer software expressed by the

59. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
60. In some limited circumstances, Examiners refer to In re Musgrave, in which the court
stated, "[Tihese claims... are directed to non-statutory processes merely because some or all the
steps therein can also be carried out in or with the aid of the human mind or because it may be
necessary for one performing the processes to think." 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
61. Two separate private conversations with Patent Examiners Naeen U. Haq and Backhean
Tiv of Technology Center 2100 (Oct. 11, 2005).
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Federal Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court has fallen on deaf ears among the
rank and file in the USPTO.
V. RECONVERGENCE

A. In re Lundgren
In late 2004, in a highly unusual precedential opinion, the USPTO
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) considered and
trounced both the technological arts test, mental steps test, and the paper
and pencil test as advanced by members of the Examining Corps in Ex
parte CarlA. Lundgren.6 2 In Lundgren, the claimed invention related to
[a] method of compensating a manager who exercises
administrative control over operations of a privately owned primary
firm for the purpose of reducing the degree to which prices exceed
marginal costs in an industry, reducing incentives for industry
collusion between the primary firm and a set of comparison firms
in [the] industry, or reducing incentives for coordinated special
interest industry lobbying.63
During the prosecution of the patent application, the Primary Examiner
rejected several of the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for failing to meet the
"technological arts" requirement.'
On appeal, the Primary Examiner found "both the invention and the
practical application to which it is directed to be outside the technological
arts, namely an economic theory expressed as a mathematical algorithm
without the disclosure or suggestion of computer, automated means,
apparatus of any kind."' 5 In support, the Examiner cited the pre-Diehr
case, In re Musgrave, in which the court stated,
All that is necessary, in our view, to make a sequence of operational
steps a statutory "process" within 35 U.S.C. § 101 is that itbe in the
technological arts so as to be in consonance with the Constitutional

62. Exparte Carl A. Lundgren, Appeal No. 2003-2088, Application S/N 08/093,516, at 3
n.59 (B.P.A.I. 2004).
63. Id. at 1.
64. Id. at 2-5.
65. Id. at 2 (internal quotation omitted).
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purpose to promote the progress of "useful arts." Const. Art. 1, sec.
8.66

The BPAI, however, did not view the Examiner's arguments as
persuasive. Rather, the BPAI found the holding in Musgrave not "to have
created a separate 'technological arts' test in determining whether a
process is statutory subject matter." 67 In fact, citing AT&T, the BPAI in
Lundgren went on to comment,
Since the Federal Circuit has held that a process claim that applies
a mathematical algorithm to "produce a useful, concrete, tangible
result without pre-empting other uses of the mathematical principle,
on its face comfortably falls within the scope of [§] 101," one
would think101.
there
6 would be no more issues to be resolved under 35
1
[§]
U.S.C.

The BPAI further rejected the existence of a paper and pencil test relating
' Thereafter, the BPAI concluded, "Our determination
to "mental steps."69
is that there is currently no judicially recognized separate 'technological
arts' test to determine patent eligible subject matter under [§] 10 1.70
B. Proposed2005 Guidelinesfor the Patentabilityof Software
At the same time as Lundgren, the Deputy Commissioner for Patent
Examination Policy produced the Interim Guidelines for Examination of
Patent Applications for Patent Subject Matter Eligibility (Interim
Guidelines).7 In the Interim Guidelines, the USPTO dropped the
"technological arts" requirement of the previous Guidelines and of the
MPEP section 2106. Rather, a new flow chart incorporated into the Interim
Guidelines as Annex I only requires that the Examiner determine whether
a claimed invention embodies a practical application of a section 101
judicial exception to the prohibition on the patentability of laws of nature,
natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.72 Exemplary circumstances

66. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
67. Lundgren, Appeal No. 2003-2088, supra note 62, at 4.
68. Id.at 3 (internal citations omitted).
69. Seeid. at4.
70. Id. at 5.
71. Patent and Trademark Office Notice, Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent
Applications for Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, availableat http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/
patog/week47/OG/TOC.htm#refl3 (last visited Apr. 26, 2006).
72. Id.
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enumerated in the Interim Guidelines include a practical application by
physical transformation of data, or a practical application that produces a
useful, tangible, and concrete result. 73 Most importantly, the Interim

Guidelines explicitly prohibit the recitation by an Examiner of any of the
technological arts, Freeman-Walter-Abele, mental steps, or human steps
tests in the formulation of a section 101 rejection.74

VI. CONCLUSION

Despite the clear guidance provided by the Interim Guidelines and the
holding in Lundgren, the Examining Corps of the USPTO continues to
render inappropriate section 101 rejections with impunity. As recently as
January 2006, one Examiner posited, while asserting a section 101
rejection for failing the technological arts test, that without such
controversy, patent attorneys and patent examiners would be without
purpose.75
Additionally, in February 2006, another Examiner stated that computer
programs are not patentable subject matter.76 Recently, Examiners have
recognized the existence of the Interim Guidelines, yet have managed to
misinterpret the directives of the Interim Guidelines so as to arrive at the
same, misunderstood Pre-Interim Guidelines results. 7 Mostly, the
disconnect between the modem jurisprudence of statutory subject matter
for computer-related inventions and the practice of patent examination can
be attributed to the inexperienced and undertrained nature of the
Examining Corps for TC2 100 and TC2700. Adequate supervision of the
Examining Corps by trained legal professionals has proven ineffective and
possibly cost prohibitive. Some might refer to the well-publicized problem
of congressional fee diversion and the resulting under-funding of the
USPTO as a root cause. In any event, patentees are likely to continue to
bear the cost of divergence.

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Private conversation with Primary Examiner Etierre LeRoux and Junior Examiner Sheree
Brown of Technology Center 2100 (Jan. 31, 2006).
76. Private conversation with Examiner Steelman in Technology Center 2100 (Feb. 16,
2006).
77. See, e.g., U.S. Patent Application S/N 10/612,613, Non-Final Office Action of April 3,
2006, at 3 (holding processors configured or logic programmed as software arrangements to be nonstatutory).
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